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SAFETY-BASED EPISTEMOLOGY: WHITHER NOW? 
 
I. SAETY-BASED EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
In a number of placessee, for example, Pritchard (2002a; 2002b; 2004; 2005a; 
2007a; 2007b)I have defended the thesis that the safety principle, in some form at least, 
needs to play a central role in our theory of knowledge.
1
 In particular, in Pritchard (2005a; cf. 
Pritchard 2004; 2007a), I defended this claim in terms of an epistemological project that I 
called an anti-luck epistemology. The starting point for this project is our overarching 
intuition that knowledge is incompatible with luck, what I call the anti-luck platitude. If we 
take this platitude seriously, then it suggests a novel way of approaching the problem of 
offering a definition of knowledge. What is required, it seems, is a three-stage investigation. 
First, we offer an account of luck. Second, we specify the sense in which knowledge is 
incompatible with luck. Finally, third, we put all this together to offer an anti-luck analysis of 
knowledge. Interestingly, it turns out (or so I argue at any rate) that this project of developing 
an anti-luck epistemology leads directly to the endorsement of a version of the safety 
principle as a key component in any adequate theory of knowledge. 
 Essentially, the reason for this was that luck turns out to be a modal notion. Very 
roughly (the details don’t matter for our purposes here), an event is lucky provided that it 
obtains in the actual world but does not obtain in most near-by possible worlds.
2
 (Think, for 
example, of a lottery wina paradigm case of a lucky eventas opposed to an event which 
is clearly not lucky, such as that the sun has risen this morning). Unsurprisingly, then, it 
follows that what is required to eliminate luck (in the relevant sense) from knowledge will 
turn out to be a modal principle. The core sense in which knowledge is incompatible with 
luck that I identified concerned the luck that the belief is truei.e., when one knows a 
proposition, it ought not to be a matter of luck that one’s belief is true.
3
 Roughly translated 
into modal terms, this becomes the claim that one’s true belief should not be false in most 
near-by possible worlds, and that’s essentially what safety amounts to.  
 As has been noted in the literature, adopting safety has a number of important 
advantages. For example, as Ernest Sosa (1999) points out, it seems it can better account for 
our inductive and anti-sceptical knowledge when compared with other modal principles, like 
 3 
the sensitivity principle.
4
 Moreover, I have arguede.g., Pritchard (2007b)that this 
proposal can also deal with some other pressing difficulties in epistemology, such as the 
lottery problem. 
The formulation of safety that I have settled upon is as follows: 
 
The Safety Principle 
S’s belief is safe iff in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about the 
target proposition in the same way as in the actual world, and in all very close near-by possible worlds 
in which S continues to form her belief about the target proposition in the same way as the actual 
world, her belief continues to be true.
5
  
 
A few comments are in order about this formulation of the safety principle.  
 First, the account only applies to what I call fully contingent propositions, where these 
are propositions which are not necessary in any sense (e.g., logically, metaphysically, 
physically, etc.,). For obvious reasons, if one allowed the principle to apply to these 
propositions then one would encounter problems because these propositions are not false in 
any near-by possible worlds. Accordingly, if one happened to have a stubborn belief in these 
propositionsi.e., a belief which one retained across all near-by possible worldsthen one 
would thereby have a safe belief which was, on this score at least, in the market for 
knowledge, regardless of the provenance of that belief. Clearly, this would be an unwelcome 
result.  
Notice, however, that it is pretty easy to see how one might go about extending the 
account of safety to these propositions, even if the details might be tricky. After all, all we 
need to do is to talk of the doxastic result of the target belief-forming process, whatever that 
might be, and not focus solely on belief in the target proposition. For example, if one forms 
one’s belief that 2 + 2 = 4 by tossing a coin, then while there are no near-by possible worlds 
where that belief is false, there is a wide class of near-by possible worlds where that belief-
forming process brings about a doxastic result which is false (e.g., a possible world in which 
one in this way forms the belief that 2 + 2 = 5). The focus on fully contingent propositions is 
thus simply a way of simplifying the account; it does not represent an admission that the 
account only applies to a restricted class of propositions.
6
 
 Second, we need to be clear about what the relationship is between safety and 
knowledge on my view. In particular, notice that I do not claim that there is never more to 
knowledge than safe belief. Indeed, all I actually claim is that because safety captures the 
 4 
anti-luck platitude, a platitude which captures a central insight about the nature of knowledge, 
it follows that what is core to knowledge is safe belief. This claim, however, is compatible 
with the thought that often, and perhaps even always, some further condition would need to 
be met in order for one to have knowledge.  
As it happens, however, I also argue in Pritchard (2005a) that if we want to resolve 
the sceptical problem then we will have to allow that at least sometimes there is nothing more 
to knowing a proposition than having a safe belief. The reason for this is that I independently 
argue that any adequate response to the sceptical problem will need to defend the thesis that 
we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses. Crucially, however, I also argue that the 
only thing that is epistemically in favour of such beliefs is that, if we know roughly what we 
think we know, they are safe (for if we do know a great a deal, then it follows that possible 
worlds in which sceptical hypotheses obtain are inevitably far-off possible worlds). That said, 
I also grant that any such response to the sceptical problem will be intellectually 
dissatisfying. Allowing that sometimes safe belief suffices for knowledge would not amount 
to a “happy-face” solution to the problem of radical scepticism.
7
   
Finally, third, notice that it is an advantage of the anti-luck account of knowledge that 
it motivates safety in this way. For one thing, it anchors the safety principle to a more 
general, and widely accepted, platitude about knowledge. For another, given the undoubted 
attractions of the safety principle as a condition on knowledge, that the project of anti-luck 
epistemology should lead to such a principle is also additional evidence in favour of the 
utility of approaching the problem of defining knowledge in this fashion.  
 
 
II. MCEVOY ON SAFETY 
 
Still, the objections to the view have come thick-and-fast. I have dealt with a number 
of them elsewhere;
8
 here I want to consider two more recent objections. The first is found in 
a very interesting paper by Mark McEvoy, ‘The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety 
Analysis of Knowledge’.  
 McEvoy’s chief complaint is that the safety principle is unable to appropriately 
explain why we lack knowledge in the lottery case. Recall that the lottery puzzle arises 
because it seems that forming one’s belief that one is the owner of a losing ticket to a fair 
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lottery with long odds by reflecting on the low probabilities involved does not seem to lead 
one to knowledge. The puzzle, however, is that in this case the evidential support for one’s 
beliefat least where this is conceived of in terms of probabilistic support for the target 
propositionis extremely high, and certainly much higher than other beliefs which one holds 
which do amount to knowledge. Compare, for example, this belief with a parallel belief that 
one has lost formed on the basis of reading the result in a reliable newspaper. It seems that in 
this second case one can come to know that one has lost the lottery in this fashion, even 
though the astronomical odds of winning the lottery are such that the probability that this 
newspaper has printed a misprint is significantly higher than the probability that one wins the 
lottery. 
 The moral I draw from the lottery case is that knowledge is not a function of the 
probabilistic strength of one’s evidence (in the sense that the greater this probabilistic 
strength, the more likely it is that you know). Instead, we need to think of knowledge in 
explicitly modal terms, where possible worlds are in turn thought of as ordered, in the usual 
way, in terms of their similarity to the actual world rather than in terms of their probabilistic 
likelihood. This difference makes all the difference, for notice that low probability events, 
like lottery wins, occur in near-by possible worlds on this similarity ordering. After all, all 
that needs to be different in order for one’s ticket to be a winning ticket is that a few 
numbered balls fall in a slightly different configuration.  
With this in mind, and given the further claim (which I will return to in a moment) 
that reliable newspapers do not misprint lottery results in near-by possible worlds, it follows 
that there is a crucial difference between forming one’s belief that one has lost the lottery by 
reflecting on the odds involved and forming that same belief by reading a reliable newspaper. 
After all, the former belief is unsafe, unlike the latter belief. For if one forms one’s belief by 
considering only the odds involved, then there will be a class of near-by possible worldsthe 
worlds in which one wins the lottery, but everything else remains the samein which one 
forms a false belief via this method. In contrast, since there is no near-by possible world in 
which the reliable newspaper misprints the lottery result, it follows that there is no near-by 
possible world in which one forms one’s belief in the target proposition in this way and yet 
forms a false belief. 
 Now one might object to this by arguing, as McEvoy does, that it is in fact far from 
obvious that there are no near-by possible worlds in which the reliable newspaper makes a 
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mistake and prints the wrong result. As he puts it, such a world would be one where all that is 
different is that “the person typing up the lottery results hits a key beside the one that he 
should have hit” (p. 12). As it happens, I don’t doubt that there are newspaperslocal ‘rags’ 
with one permanent member of staff, saywhich are produced in such a way that this is a 
near-by possibility, but equally I don’t think one gains safe belief, and thus potentially 
knowledge, that one has lost a lottery from these sorts of newspapers. It would, I think, be 
rash to tear up one’s ticket after only checking the result in one of these papers. 
 The point here is that reliable newspapersthe kind of newspapers that one can use 
to come to know that one has lost the lotteryhave checks built-in to prevent misprints of 
this sort occurring. The staff are highly trained and diligent, all information is checked and 
double-checked by efficient copy-editors, and, perhaps most significantly, those checking the 
results are likely to be lottery ticket owners themselves, and so have a vested interest in the 
accuracy of the result printed. In short, I think that once we understand the details of the case 
properly, then it isn’t very plausible to suppose that the possible worlds where our hero forms 
a false belief in the target proposition are close ones. 
 Moreover, notice that it is entirely consistent with the safety principle as I have 
defined it to allow that there might be some possible worlds in which the reliable newspaper 
prints a misprint in this way. This is because the formulation of the principle that I offer 
‘weights’ the near-by possible worlds in terms of how close they are to the actual world. Very 
close near-by possible worlds are thus more important than not-so-close near-by possible 
worlds. The rationale for this weighting of worlds is that we become more tolerant of error as 
we move out through the possible worlds. Thus, that there are some near-by, but not very 
close, possible worlds where the agent forms a false belief in the target proposition might be 
tolerated, even though it is not tolerated that there be false belief of this sort in the very close 
near-by possible worlds. This is important because even if one grants that there are some 
near-by possible worlds where reliable newspapers print the wrong result, these worlds are 
clearly not going to be very close near-by worlds. In contrast, the possible worlds in which 
one wins the lottery are very close, since all that needs to change is that a few coloured balls 
should fall in a slightly different configuration.  
 Thus, if one reads the details of the example properly, and also keeps the right 
formulation of the safety principle in mind, this objection to the safety-based approach fails 
to get a grip.
9
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III. KELP ON SAFETY 
 
A different kind of problem for safety-based accounts of knowledge is posed by 
Christoph Kelp (2007). Kelp argues that safety cannot be necessary for knowledge because of 
the existence of ‘Frankfurt-style’ cases where the agent forms her true belief entirely 
appropriatelyand so gains knowledgebut where her belief is nonetheless unsafe.  
The example that Kelp offers to illustrate this problem concerns a demon who wants 
our herolet’s call him ‘Chris’to form a belief that the time is 8.22am when he comes 
down the stairs first thing in the morning (the demon doesn’t care whether the belief is true). 
Since he is a demon, with lots of special powers, he is able to ensure that Chris believes this 
proposition (e.g., by manipulating the clock). Now suppose that Chris does indeed come 
downstairs that morning at exactly 8.22am, and so forms a belief that the time is 8.22am by 
looking at the clock at the bottom of the stairs. Since Chris is going to form this belief 
anyway, the demon doesn’t need to do anything to ensure that he forms the belief in the 
target proposition. Moreover, since Chris is forming his belief by consulting a reliable clock, 
one would intuitively regard this as an instance of knowledge (or so Kelp argues at any rate). 
Nevertheless, the belief is clearly unsafe, since there are many near-by possible worlds in 
which Chris continues to form the belief that it is 8.22am and yet this belief is false (because 
of the interference of the demon).  
 I think this example is ingenious. It’s weak point, however, lies in the claim that Chris 
genuinely does have knowledge in this case. I’m not so sure. As I have argued 
elsewheree.g., Pritchard (forthcominga; forthcomingb; manuscript)we need to make a 
distinction between cognitive achievement and knowledge, where the former is more 
compatible with luck than the latter. With this distinction in place, I think it becomes clear 
that what is in play here is not knowledge but rather a mere cognitive achievement that falls 
short of knowledge. 
I take my account of cognitive achievement from virtue epistemologists, particularly 
John Greco (e.g., 2002; forthcominga; forthcomingb; forthcomingc).
10
 The idea is that 
achievements are successes that are because of ability and hence that cognitive achievements 
are cognitive successes (i.e., true beliefs) that are because of cognitive abilities (i.e., 
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epistemic virtues, broadly conceived). This account of achievements is, I think, essentially 
correct. Achievements clearly involve success, but an archer who hits a target while lacking 
any relevant abilities has not exhibited an achievement even despite her success. Moreover, it 
is also vital that the archer’s success should be because of the exercise of her relevant 
abilities. A skilful archer who fires at a target but who is only successful at hitting that target 
because of a fortuitous series of gusts of wind does not exhibit an achievement, even though 
she is successful and also possesses the relevant abilities (this would be a kind of Gettier-
style case). What is required, then, is a success that is best explained in terms of the exercise 
of the agent’s abilitiesi.e., a success that is because of one’s abilityand this is what is 
lacking in this case.
11
 
The same goes for cognitive achievements. Mere cognitive success does not suffice 
for cognitive achievement, since relevant cognitive ability is also required. Equally, however, 
neither does the mere conjunction of (relevant) cognitive ability and cognitive success suffice 
for cognitive achievement if that success is ‘gettierized’. If one forms a belief that there is a 
sheep in the field by looking at a big hairy dog that one mistakes for a sheep, then one does 
not exhibit a cognitive achievement even if one does have the relevant cognitive abilities and 
even if, as it happens, one’s belief is true (e.g., there is a sheep hidden from view behind the 
big hairy dog). And the natural explanation for why this is the case is that one’s true belief is 
not best explained in terms of one’s cognitive abilities, but rather by the good fortune that 
there happens to be a sheep hidden from view behind the big hairy dog that one is looking at. 
Cognitive achievements, like achievements more generally, are clearly important to 
us. All other things being equal, one would rather get to the truth in this way than by dumb 
luck, just as, all other things being equal, one would rather hit the target with one’s arrow 
through one’s ability rather than by dumb luck. Indeed, given the properties of cognitive 
achievements, one might also be tempted to hold that knowledge should be analysed in terms 
of this notion, such that knowledge just is cognitive achievement.
12
 While there are some 
close ties between the two notions, however, I think this would be a mistake, and one of the 
reasons for this is that cognitive achievements are less resistant to epistemic luck than 
knowledge is.
13
 
 The easiest way to demonstrate this point is by considering the difference between the 
kind of epistemic luck that is in play in Gettier-style cases, such as the ‘sheep’ case just 
described, and the very different kind of epistemic luck in play in cases like the ‘barn façade’ 
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case. Recall that in the barn façade case the agentlet’s call him ‘Barney’forms a belief 
that the object before him is a barn by looking at what is in fact a barn. Unbeknownst to him, 
however, he is in barn façade county, where all the other barn-shaped objects are clever 
fakes. In both this case and the sheep case, the agent’s true belief is unsafe, in that there is a 
wide class of near-by possible worlds in which he continues to believe the target proposition 
and yet believes falsely. Moreover, I think most would agree that the epistemic luck in play 
ensures that neither agent has knowledge.
14
 That said, the form of epistemic luck in these two 
cases is clearly different. After all, in the sheep case, the agent doesn’t see a sheep at all; the 
luck at issue ‘intervenes’ between the agent’s cognitive ability and the fact, albeit in such a 
way that the belief is true nonetheless. In contrast, in the barn façade case luck of this 
‘intervening’ sort is absent, and the luck is instead solely environmental. That is, while 
Barney really does see a barn, he has the misfortune to be in an environment which is 
extremely unfriendly from an epistemic point of view, and it is this feature of the 
environment which ensures that his belief is only luckily true.  
 Interestingly, while both the ‘intervening’ epistemic luck in play in the Gettier-style 
cases and the ‘environmental’ epistemic luck in play in barn-façade-style cases is 
incompatible with knowledge, only the former type of luck is incompatible with cognitive 
achievements. That is, I want to suggest that a genuine cognitive achievement is exhibited in 
the barn façade case, even though the agent lacks knowledge. After all, no-one would dispute 
that Barney is displaying the relevant cognitive abilities. Moreover, and this is the crucial 
point, it seems entirely natural to say that Barney’s cognitive success in this case is best 
explained in terms of his cognitive abilities (though we wouldn’t say this in a Gettier-style 
case, such as the sheep example).  
Indeed, I think this point applies to achievements more generally. Imagine an archer 
who selects a target at random, skilfully fires at that target, and hits the target. If the Gettier-
style luck were presentsuch as if a freak gust of wind blew the arrow off-course but a 
second freak gust of wind blew it back on course againthen we would not credit the agent 
with exhibiting an achievement. Her success, we would say, is best explained in terms of the 
fortuitous gusts of wind than in terms of her relevant abilities. In contrast, suppose that the 
luck in play were purely environmental. Suppose, for example, that nothing intervenes 
between the agent’s skilfully firing the arrow and her hitting the target, but that her success is 
still a matter of luck because she just happened to choose the one target on the range that, 
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unbeknownst to her, is not fitted with an invisible forcefield that repels arrows. While in both 
cases the success is lucky and hence unsafein the sense that there is a wide class of near-by 
possible worlds in which the agent’s attempt to hit a target is unsuccessfulwe would surely 
want to say in the second case that the agent exhibits a genuine achievement. After all, her 
abilities at archery offer the best explanation of why she is successful. It follows, then, that 
achievements are compatible with environmental luck even though they are incompatible 
with Gettier-style intervening luck. 
 Notice that structurally the barn façade case is just like the second archery case just 
described, in that the luck in play is purely environmental. Moreover, just as we are inclined 
to credit the archer in this case with exhibiting a genuine achievement, so we are inclined to 
credit Barney in the barn façade case with exhibiting a genuine cognitive achievement, 
despite the luck involved in both cases. In any case, the moral of the preceding discussion is 
that while knowledge and cognitive achievement are closely related notions, one can exhibit 
a cognitive achievement while failing to know because of the presence of environmental 
epistemic luck.
15
 
The import of this point to Kelp’s Frankfurt-style case is that what is being exhibited 
in this example is, I would claim, not knowledge at all, but rather a mere cognitive 
achievement. In order to see this, one only has to note that this case is essentially a barn-
façade-style case in which the agent’s true belief is infected by environmental luck. While 
nothing intervenes between Chris’s cognitive ability and his cognitive successhe really 
does employ his cognitive abilities in order to gain his true belief about the timehe is in a 
very unfriendly environment from an epistemic point of view. Nevertheless, because the 
demon doesn’t in fact interfere in the actual case, I think we should regard Chris’s true belief 
as a cognitive achievementhis abilities are, after all, the best explanation of why he is 
successfuleven though his belief is only luckily true. Crucially, however, he doesn’t have 
knowledge, because although the environmental luck in play does not prevent him from 
exhibiting a cognitive achievement, it does prevent him from gaining knowledge, just as it 
does in the barn façade case.  
Given the close connections between knowledge and cognitive achievement that I 
have already commented on, it is not surprising that our intuitions are less than conclusive in 
cases like this; after all, often if one exhibits a cognitive achievement then one will also have 
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gained knowledge in the target proposition. Still, once one separates these two notions, then it 
becomes clear that while there is something very positive, from an epistemic point of view, 
that can be said about Chris’s belief, the epistemic luck in play ensures that this is not a case 
of knowledge. 
 
 
IV. WHITHER NOW FOR SAFETY-BASED EPISTEMOLOGY? 
 
While I do not regard the kinds of cases offered by McEvoy and Kelp to be 
devastating to a safety-based epistemology, it should be noted that I am now more sceptical 
about the role that safety should play in one’s theory of knowledge than I used to be. The 
reason for this is that it seems inevitable that there will be cases in which an agent has a safe 
belief but lacks knowledge because the direction of fit between the belief and the fact is all 
wrong (i.e., where the belief isn’t being responsive to the facts, but rather the facts are being 
responsive to the belief). Consider an agent, let’s call him ‘Temp’, who is forming his belief 
about the temperature in the room by consulting a thermometer on the wall. He has no reason 
to doubt that this thermometer is working. Unbeknownst to him, however, the thermometer is 
broken and is fluctuating within a given range. Nevertheless, as it happens this is a great way 
for Temp to form his beliefs about the temperature of the room because, hidden from view, 
there is someone in the room next to the thermostat who is observing Temp and ensuring that 
every time Temp goes to consult the thermometer the reading on the thermometer 
corresponds to the actual temperature of the room. 
 Clearly, Temp cannot come to know the temperature of the room by consulting a 
broken thermometer. Nevertheless, his beliefs are extremely safe, since in all near-by 
possible worlds where he forms his belief in the target proposition, his belief will be true.
16
 
What such cases illustrate, it seems to me, is that we need two key components to a theory of 
knowledge over and above true belief. The first is, of course, the anti-luck condition, 
expressed as safetycases like this clearly don’t threaten the necessity of safety to an 
analysis of knowledge. The second, however, is an ability condition of some sorti.e., a 
condition to the effect that the true belief was gained via the employment of the agent’s 
reliable cognitive abilities. After all, the reason why we don’t credit Temp with knowledge is 
that the relationship between his belief and the fact is all wrong; the facts are changing to 
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correspond with what he believes rather than vice versa. Were we to stipulate that Temp’s 
true belief should be the product of his cognitive ability, however, then we would be able to 
handle such cases.  
 There are two important points to note about this claim that one’s theory of 
knowledge requires both an anti-luck and an ability condition. The first is to emphasise how 
this is a departure from the earlier view. After all, given that, as I noted above, it was part-
and-parcel of the early view to allow that there might need to be a further condition (or 
conditions) in one’s theory of knowledge over and above safe belief, one might naturally 
wonder what is so radically different about now arguing for the inclusion of an additional 
ability condition in one’s theory of knowledge. The answer to this question is that the way I 
was conceiving of this additional condition (or conditions) was as merely ‘tweaking’ the 
safety-based analysis of knowledge, such that it was safety that was capturing what is core to 
knowledge. On this view, knowledge is, in essence, non-lucky true belief. I now hold, in 
contrast, that the intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability is just as strong and as 
central to our ordinary thinking about knowledge as our intuition that knowledge excludes 
luck. Moreover, as we have seen, we cannot accommodate this intuition with the anti-luck 
condition, however it is formulated. Adding the ability condition thus constitutes more than 
just a mere ‘tweak’ to the original safety-based proposal. 
 The second point to note about the foregoing is that it is central to the view that the 
anti-luck conditionsafetyand the ability condition (however that is to be formulated) 
impose distinct demands. We have already seen that the safety condition by itself cannot 
accommodate all cases because one needs the ability condition to deal with the Temp case. 
Equally, however, no formulation of the ability condition will be able to handle all cases 
either, since there will be cases which can only be handled by appeal to an anti-luck 
condition. We witnessed one such case earlier on when we discussed the barn façade 
example. In this case there is no dispute that cognitive ability is being appropriately 
employed by Barney; indeed, it is being employed to the extent that he is properly credited 
with exhibiting a cognitive achievement. Nevertheless, Barney does not know that what he is 
looking at is a barn, and the reason for this is that his belief is only luckily true; it is unsafe.
17
  
 So whereas my earlier view was a form of anti-luck epistemology, my current 
position has altered slightly and I now endorse a different view, what one might call an anti-
luck virtue epistemology.
18
 
 13 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Axtell, Guy. 2003. “Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology.” Metaphilosophy 34: 
353-66; and reprinted in M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Moral and Epistemic Virtues, 
331-52, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).  
. 2007. “Two For the Show: Anti-Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance.” 
Synthese 158: 363-83. 
Becker, Kelly. 2006. “Reliabilism and Safety.” Metaphilosophy 37: 961-704. 
Coffman, E. J. 2007. “Thinking About Luck.” Synthese 158: 383-98. 
Comesaña, Juan. 2005. “Unsafe Knowledge.” Synthese 146: 395-404. 
Goldberg, Sandy. 2007. “How Lucky Can You Get?” Synthese 158: 314-27. 
Greco, John. 2002. “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.” In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski 
(eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
. 2003. “Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise.” Metaphilosophy 34: 353-66; and 
reprinted in M. S. Brady and D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Moral and Epistemic Virtues, 258-70, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
. 2007. “Worries About Pritchard’s Safety.” Synthese 158: 299-302. 
. Forthcominga. “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.” Philosophical 
Issues.  
. Forthcomingb. “The Value Problem.” In A. Haddock, A. Millar, & D. H. Pritchard 
(eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
. Forthcomingc. “What’s Wrong With Contextualism?” The Philosophical Quarterly.  
Hetherington, Stephen. 1998. “Actually Knowing.” The Philosophical Quarterly 48: 453-69. 
Hiller, Avram and Neta, Ram. 2007. “Safety and Epistemic Luck.” Synthese 158: 303-13. 
Kelp, Christoph. 2008. “Knowledge and Safety.” Journal of Philosophical Research 33. 
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007. “Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know.” Synthese 
158: 345-61. 
. Forthcoming. “What Luck is Not”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.  
McEvoy, Mark. 2008. “The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge”, 
Journal of Philosophical Research 33. 
Miscevic, Nenad. 2007. “Armchair Luck.” Acta Analytica 22: 1-22.  
Nozick, Robert. 1991. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Neta, Ram and Rohrbaugh, Guy. 2003. “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge.” Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 85: 396-406. 
Duncan Pritchard. 2002a. “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 39: 215-57. 
. 2002b. “Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.” International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 10: 283-307.  
. 2003. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.” Metaphilosophy 34: 106-30; and 
reprinted in M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), Moral and Epistemic Virtues, 210-34, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
. 2004. “Epistemic Luck.” Journal of Philosophical Research 29: 193-222. 
. 2005a. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 14 
. 2005b. “Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Angst.” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 83: 185-206. 
. 2007a.  “Anti-Luck Epistemology.” Synthese 158: 277-97. 
. 2007b. “Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries.” In V. F. Hendricks & D. H. Pritchard (eds.), 
New Waves in Epistemology. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
. 2008a. “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology.” In J. Greco (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Scepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
. 2008b. “Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited.” Metaphilosophy 39: 1-
23. 
. Forthcominga. “Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements.” The 
Philosophical Quarterly.  
. Forthcomingb. “Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.” In A. O’Hear (ed.), 
Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
. Manuscript. “The Value of Knowledge”.  
Riggs, Wayne. 2007. “Why Epistemologists Are So Down on Their Luck.” Synthese 158: 
329-44. 
. Forthcoming. “Luck, Knowledge, and Control.” In A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. H. 
Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sainsbury, R. M. 1997. “Easy Possibilities.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 
907-19. 
Schiffer, Stephen. 1996. “Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism.” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 96: 317-33. 
Sosa, Ernest. 1988. “Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge.” Mind 97: 153-89. 
. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
. 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.” Philosophical Perspectives 13, 141-54. 
. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Williamson, Timothy. 20000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the 
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
. 1999. “What is Knowledge?” In J. Greco & E. Sosa (eds.), Epistemology. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 92-116. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1  Defences of the safety principle (and related principles) can be found in a number of places. See, for example, 
Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999) and Williamson (2000). 
2  For some critical discussions of my account of luck, see Coffman (2007), Riggs (2007; forthcoming) and 
Lackey (forthcoming).  
3  The non-core type of luck that is incompatible with knowledge need not concern us here. For further 
discussion of this secondary type of malignant epistemic luck, see Pritchard (2004; 2005a, ch. 6; 2005b).  
4  For more on the sensitivity principle, see Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981). For more on the relationship 
between safety and sensitivity more generally, see Pritchard (2005a, ch. 6; 2008a).  
5  This is the version of safety that I defend in Pritchard (2007a), and which I claim can avoid various objections 
that have been proposed for safety by, for example, Greco (2007).  
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6  See Miscevic (2007) for one development of the safety-based approach that I defend to non-fully contingent 
propositions.  
7  The phrase is due to Schiffer (1996).  
8  Pritchard (2007a) discusses some issues raised by Axtell (2007), Coffman (2007), Goldberg (2007), Greco 
(2007), Hiller & Neta (2007), Lackey (2007) and Riggs (2007). Pritchard (2008b) revisits an earlier symposium 
on virtue epistemology and epistemic luck involving myself (Pritchard 2003), Greco (2003) and Axtell (2003), 
and also discusses an additional paper by Becker (2006). For two recent papers that critique the safety principle 
(albeit not my version of it), see Neta & Rohrbaugh (2004) and Comesaña (2005). 
9  Interestingly, McEvoy anticipates this response to his objection, and tries to deal with it by citing some real-
life examples of misprints made by reliable newspapers, such as The New York Times mistakenly printing that 
the Dalai Lama had visited Nepal often, rather than just once (p. 12). I don’t think such examples demonstrate 
what they are meant to demonstrate, however, since the type of mistake involved is very different. That a sub-
editor might not realise that the Dalai Lama had only visited Nepal once rather than often is a very different sort 
of mistake to that same sub-editor not noticing that the lottery results have been printed wrongly; the latter error 
is clearly much easier to spot, and will be spotted if the sub-editors are doing their job properly. 
10  The general idea behind Greco’s account of cognitive achievement can be found in earlier work by Sosa 
(1988; 1991; 2007) and Zagzebski (1996; 1999).  
11  There are, of course, other potential ways of reading the ‘because of’ than in explanatory terms. See, for 
example, Sosa (2007, passim) for an alternative proposal in this regard. The explanatory account of ‘because of’ 
strikes me as the most developed in the literature, however, and this is why I opt for it here. That said, as far as 
this paper goes nothing of importance rides on which account of this relation one endorses.  
  
12  This is the line taken by Greco (2002; forthcominga; forthcomingb; forthcomingc). Cf. Sosa (2007, passim).  
13  The other reason why I think one shouldn’t identify knowledge with cognitive achievement is that there are 
some cases of knowledge which don’t involve cognitive achievement. I discuss such cases in Pritchard 
(forthcominga; forthcomingb; manuscript).  
14  For two examples of epistemologists who hold that the agent in the barn façade case does have knowledge, 
see Hetherington (1998) and Sosa (2007, ch. 2).  
15  I defend this line of argument at greater length in Pritchard (forthcominga; forthcomingb; manuscript). 
16  This might not follow from the example as it is just described, but it will certainly follow if we supplement it 
in some straightforward wayse.g., stipulate the person in the room will never desert his post, that he is 
extremely reliable and diligent in his work, and so on. 
17  Although it isn’t important for our purposes here, I also hold that sometimes agents can possess knowledge 
even though they haven’t exhibited the corresponding cognitive achievement. For more on this point, see 
Pritchard (forthcominga; forthcomingb; manuscript). 
18
  I am grateful to Mike DePaul for encouraging me to write this paper, and to Christoph Kelp for helpful 
discussion of related topics. 
